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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EXCLUSIONARY RULE - EVIDENCE
OBTAINED FROM UNLAWFUL POLICE CONDUCT MAY BE ADMIT-
TED INTO COURT UNDER THE "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY" Ex-
CEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. Nix v. Williams, 104 S.
Ct. 2501 (1984).
In Nix v. Williams,' a divided2 United States Supreme Court
held that evidence obtained from unlawful police conduct may be
admitted into court" under the "inevitable discovery" exception4 to
the exclusionary rule." The Court reasoned that if the prosecution
can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence6 that the infor-
mation inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then
the deterrence rationale' of the exclusionary rule would be rendered
meaningless and the evidence should be admitted. Significantly, Wil-
liams is the first United States Supreme Court decision' to recognize
the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule and
thereby permit the introduction of evidence that would otherwise be
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."9
On December 26, 1968, two days after the disappearance of a
ten-year old girl in Des Moines, Iowa, Robert Anthony Williams, an
escapee from a mental institution and a deeply religious person,"0
I. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
2. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Although Justice White joined in the
majority opinion, he filed a concurrence providing further comment. Justice Stevens concurred
in the judgment. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion dis-
agreeing with the burden of proof the prosecution must satisfy to introduce evidence under the
"inevitable discovery" exception.
3. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Supreme court refused to
extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. Thus, the "inevitable discovery" excep-
tion also would not apply to information introduced in grand jury proceedings.
4. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
6. Preponderance of evidence is defined as "Evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than the evidence that is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as
a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1064 (5th ed. 1979).
7. Deterrence of official misconduct is one of the two distinct purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
8. The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the
"inevitable discovery" rule on several occasions. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. "Fruit of the poisonous tree" is evidence which is derived from unlawful official
conduct. The evidence is generally inadmissible against the defendant because of its original
taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Justice Frankfurter first used
the phrase when writing for the Court in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
10. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 412 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
surrendered to the local police in Davenport, Iowa.1" Williams was
promptly arraigned. Two Des Moines police officers arranged to
drive the 160 miles to Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him
directly to Des Moines without questioning him. 2 Williams was ad-
vised of his right to remain silent on several occasions before being
driven to Des Moines.
13
During the return trip to Des Moines, one of the officers began
a conversation14 with Williams in which he told Williams that the
parents of the little girl deserved to give their daughter a Christian
burial and that the falling snow would soon make it impossible to
recover the body. The detective suggested that they stop and locate
the body on the way to Des Moines. The detective informed Wil-
liams not to answer, but only to think about what he had said."
After listening to the detective's speech, Williams made several in-
criminating disclosures" and directed the officers to the body,
17
which was found essentially within the area to be searched."8
Prior to trial in the Iowa Court,'9 Williams moved to suppress
I1. A warrant and an all points bulletin had been issued for Williams' arrest by the
Des Moines Police Department. Williams telephoned.a Des Moines attorney and on the attor-
ney's advice surrendered to the Davenport police. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 399
(Iowa Sup. Ct. 1970).
12. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391.
13. Williams was advised of his right to remain silent by the Des Moines attorney he
contacted, the Davenport judge who arraigned him on the outstanding arrest warrant, a local
Davenport attorney, and by one of the Des Moines police officers who returned Williams to
Des Moines. Id.
14. Captain Leaming of the Des Moines Police Department delivered his now famous
"Christian burial speech" in which he addressed Williams as "Reverend" and stated:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road
.... They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you
yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ... and if
you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And since we
will be going right past the area (where the body is] on the way into Des
Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this
little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered . . . . [A]fter a
snow storm [we may not be] able to find it at all.
Id. at 392-93. For an exhaustive discussion of the record of Williams, see Kamisar, Forward:
Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Discomfitting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Kamisar].
15. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 393.
16. Williams inquired whether the police had found the victim's shoes, and directed the
officers to a service station where he allegedly left the shoes. Williams subsequently asked
whether the police had found a blanket, and directed the officers to a rest area where Williams
said he had disposed of the blanket. Id.
17. Id.
18. Two hundred volunteers divided into teams to search for the victim's body. The
volunteers were instructed to check all roads, ditches, culverts, and any other place where the
body could be hidden. At the time that the search was terminated in reaction to Williams'
confession, one search team was tracking only two and one-half miles from where the body
was found in a ditch. Tr. of Hearings on Motion to Suppress in State v. Williams, No. CR
55805, at 34-39 (May 31, 1977).
19. Williams was indicted and tried for first-degree murder in an Iowa state court.
State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1970).
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all evidence relating to or resulting from the statements he made
during the return trip to Des Moines,' 0 alleging that such evidence
was the fruit of statements obtained in violation of his fifth" and
sixth amendment" rights. The motion to suppress was denied and
Williams was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. On appeal, a sharply divided Iowa Supreme Court'3
upheld the conviction, finding that the totality of the circumstances"'
clearly demonstrated Williams' voluntary and intelligent waiver of
his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel dur-
ing the return trip. The United States District Court granted Wil-
liams' petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ruling that Williams was
entitled to a new trial because his fifth and sixth amendment rights
were violated by the officer's "interrogation.""21 A divided Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.' In a landmark decision, a
sharply divided Supreme Court of the United States 7 affirmed, con-
cluding that the statements made by Williams were "deliberately
elicited" by the police in violation of his sixth amendment right to
counsel and that any evidence obtained as a result of the violation
was improperly admitted at trial.'6 The case was remanded to the
20. Williams contended that the State failed to prove that he voluntarily gave informa-
tion to the officers with whom he was riding and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel at the time he rendered the infor-
mation. Id.
21. The fifth amendment states, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONsT. amend V.
22. The sixth amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
23. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1970).
24. The Court recognized the totality-of-circumstances test to determine a waiver of
constitutionally protected rights in the absence of an express waiver. The Court stated that a
waiver may be found from an examination of all the attendant facts and circumstances. Id. at
401. Accord, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1961); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938).
25. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974). In its decision, the court
concluded that the conduct of the detective constituted interrogation of Williams and, in the
absence of the accused's attorneys, violated Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel. The
court relied on the right of an accused to have counsel present at interrogation as established
in Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and two circuit courts of appeal decisions,
United States ex rel. Magoon v. Reincke, 304 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Conn. 1968), affd, 416 F.2d
69 (2d Cir. 1969) and Taylor v. Elliot, 458 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
885 (1972).
26. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974).
27. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
28. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), in which the Court established that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments entitled a defendant to the assistance of counsel at or after the
time formal proceedings had been initiated against him. The Court held that judicial proceed-
ings had been initiated against Williams prior to the commencement of the return trip to Des
Moines since a warrant had been issued for his arrest and he had been arraigned on the
warrant before a judge in a Davenport courtroom. In addition, the Court relied on the clear
rule of Messiah that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, the
individual has the right to the assistance of counsel when interrogated. Id. at 204. The Su-
preme Court held that the detective's "Christian burial speech" was tantamount to interroga-
tion; therefore, entitling Williams to legal representation when he made the incriminating
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state court.
At Williams' second trial in the Iowa court, the court concluded
that the body would have been discovered in essentially the same
condition as it was actually found had Williams not led the police to
the victim. The court, therefore, permitted the challenged evidence
to be admitted and the jury again found Williams guilty of first-
degree murder.2 9 On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Wil-
liams' conviction and expressly adopted the "inevitable discovery"
exception to the exclusionary rule. 0 Williams again sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court, but the court de-
nied his petition, ruling that the State had successfully satisfied the
requirements of the "inevitable discovery" exception.3 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, without discussing the constitutional-
ity of the "inevitable discovery" exception, reversed, holding that the
State had failed to prove that the detective's actions were not in bad
faith.3 2 The court denied a petition for rehearing en banc.3a The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the pro-
priety of the state court's decision in Williams' second trial to admit
evidence of the discovery of the victim's body on the basis of the
"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. The Su-
preme Court held that the evidence was properly admitted and rec-
statements. Furthermore, in determining whether Williams waived his constitutional right to
counsel, the Court held that the State was required to prove "an intentional relinquishment of
a known right or privilege" as established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The
Court concluded that under the circumstances of the case, Williams had not waived his right
to counsel.
It is significant to note that although the Court held that Williams' incriminating state-
ments could not be admitted into evidence at a second trial, the majority implied that the
"inevitable discovery" exception would be available on retrial. The Court stated in a footnote
to the opinion that evidence of the location and condition of the body "might well be admissi-
ble on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminat-
ing statements not been elicited from Williams." Williams, 430 U.S. at 407 n.12. But see
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983) (n.12 not intended by Supreme
Court to be taken as "full-dress statement" of the inevitable discovery exception). For an ex-
haustive discussion of the Court's reasoning in Brewer and a view of the possible future effect
of its decision, see Yasimar, Brewer v. Williams, Messiah and Miranda: What is "'Interroga-
tion"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Yasimar].
29. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984). The state court held that the State had
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the body would have been found "within a
short time" in essentially the same condition as it was actually found. Id. See supra note 6.
The State did not attempt to show that Williams had guided the police to the child's body, nor
did it offer Williams' statements into evidence. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2503.
30. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258-62 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1979). The court held
that the "inevitable discovery" exception requires the State to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the police had not acted in bad faith in order to hasten the discovery of the
victim's body, and that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means. The court
concluded that the State satisfied the necessary burden of proof. Id. at 260-62.
31. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664, 666 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
32. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir. 1983). The court adopted the re-
quirements established by the Iowa Supreme Court for applying the "inevitable discovery"
exception. See supra note 30.
33. Williams, 700 F.2d at 1175.
ognized the "inevitable discovery" rule as a constitutional exception
to the exclusionary rule.34
The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction in court of evi-
dence obtained in violation of an individual's fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendment rights.3 5 The rule requires the suppression of illegally
obtained primary evidence and so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree"
or derivative evidence.36 The scope of the exclusionary rule has been
narrowed by the Supreme Court's recognition of three major excep-
tions to the rule, resulting in an increased introduction of unlawfully
obtained evidence into court.37
The United States Supreme Court, in an attempt to protect the
rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment, first recognized the ex-
clusionary rule in the case of Weeks v. United States . 8 The Court
reasoned in Weeks that if the protections of the fourth amendment
were to be meaningful, the judiciary should not ordain the use of
evidence obtained by unlawful police practices. 9 Almost fifty years
later, the Supreme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio, extended the exclusion-
ary rule to the states.4
The Mapp opinion advanced two distinct rationale for the crea-
tion of the exclusionary rule.' 1 First, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence would deter future
unlawful police conduct.4 2 Second, the Court stated that the integ-
rity of the judicial system would be preserved by the exclusion of
34. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2512 (1984).
35. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964).
36. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (exclusionary rule
prohibits admission of indirect and direct products of unconstitutional invasions); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (fourth amendment prohibits the use of "fruit of the
poisonous tree"); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (no
evidence unlawfully obtained shall be offered before the court). See also Project, Thirteenth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1982-1983, 72 GEO. L.J. 249, 356 n.703 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Project]. See generally I
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 1.1, at 3-20
(1978).
37. See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion of
the history of the exclusionary rule, see Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983); Note, Is It Time for a Change in the Exclusionary Rule?
United States v. Williams and the Good Faith Exception, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 161 (1982).
38. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
39. Id. at 393. The Court, however, did not prohibit the use in federal court of evidence
unlawfully seized by state officers. Id. at 398. But see Elkins v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
312-13 (1921) (Court held any evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment inad-
missible in federal courts).
40. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
41. See generally I W. LAFAVE, supra note 36 § 1.1, at 17-20; Wilson, Property, Pri-
vacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 225
(1980).
42. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
evidence unlawfully obtained.43
As originally conceived, the exclusionary rule proscribed the use
of unlawfully obtained evidence for any purpose at trial.44 The Su-
preme Court has since restricted the scope of the exclusionary rule
and has recognized that the rule does not establish a per se rule of
exclusion in every situation in which evidence is obtained by official
misconduct. 5 The Court instead utilizes a balancing approach,
weighing carefully the societal interest in deterring police miscon-
duct against the interest in presenting all relevant evidence to the
jury, and invoking the rule only in situations in which the deterrent
effect of applying the rule outweighs the social cost of suppressing
probative evidence. s
In Wong Sun v. United States,7 the United States Supreme
Court outlined the parameters of the exclusionary rule's applicabil-
ity. The Court concluded that not all illegally obtained evidence need
be suppressed. Instead, the Court held that the determining standard
of the rule's applicability is whether the challenged evidence was dis-
covered "by exploitation of that illegality or . . . by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."'4
43. Id. at 659. The Court quoted a previous statement of Judge Brandeis, "Our Gov-
ernment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example . . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The interest in preserving judicial
integrity has become secondary to the interest in deterring police misconduct. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976) (dictum) (judicial integrity is limited justification for
exclusion of probative evidence); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (deterrence,
not maintenance of judicial integrity, is prime concern of exclusionary rule); David v. Attorney
Gen. of the United States, 699 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (purpose of exclusion-
ary rule to deter police misconduct); Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir.
1982) (deterrence only justification for exclusionary rule), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1256
(1983).
44. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
45. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (exclusionary rule not intended to prohibit use of all unlawfully obtained
evidence). Cf. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980) (exclusionary rule no bar
to impeachment of defendant-witness committing perjury involving challenged evidence);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (exclusionary rule not bar to use of
unlawfully obtained evidence at grand jury proceedings). For a discussion of situations in
which the Supreme Court has held the exclusionary rule inapplicable, see Project, supra note
36.
46. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1978) (Court balances com-
peting policies of exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488, 489 n.26 (1976)
(exclusionary rule requires pragmatic evaluation by balancing competing policies); Note, Im-
pending "Frontal Assault" on the Citadel: The Supreme Court's Readiness to Modify the
Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TULSA L.J.
337, 349 (1976) (Court applies exclusionary rule when potential deterrence of police miscon-
duct outweighs societal cost of excluding relevant evidence). See also Calandra, 414 U.S. at
351-72 (minimal deterrent effect achieved by extension of exclusionary rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings; insufficient to outweigh resulting harm to grand jury investigations).
47. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
48. Id. at 488. The court expressly rejected a "but for" test for excluding evidence
obtained by unlawful means. The Court held, "[W]e need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of
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The Supreme Court has expressly recognized two major excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule prior to the final Williams decision.
The first, developed by the court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,4 9 is that a trial court need not suppress evidence ob-
tained illegally if knowledge of the evidence was gained from an in-
dependent source.50 The Court's recognition of the "independent
source" exception represents a policy decision by the Court that the
need for deterrence of official misconduct does not mandate that all
illegally obtained evidence be rendered unusable. All that is re-
quired, the Court suggests, is that law enforcement officials be de-
prived of any benefit gained from their unlawful conduct. 1
The second exception, initially developed in Nardone v. United
States"2 and fully adopted in later cases,58 authorizes the use of ille-
gally obtained evidence whenever the connection between the pri-
mary illegality and the derivative evidence has been so sufficiently
attenuated as to dissipate the taint." In reaching its conclusion in
Nardone, the Court reasoned that the remoteness of the illegality
severed the requisite causal connection.5
The "inevitable discovery" rule, which the United States Su-
preme Court recognizes as a third exception to the exclusionary rule,
is not a concept unique to the Williams Court. Although never rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court prior to Williams, the "inevitable dis-
covery" rule has been recognized as an evolving exception to the ex-
clusionary rule in a vast majority of federal and state courts."
Under the "inevitable discovery" rule, evidence unlawfully ob-
tained is not suppressed when the prosecution establishes that the
challenged evidence would have been discovered by lawful means re-
gardless of the improper official conduct.57 The justification of ad-
the police." Id. at 487-88. Thus, in determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule, a court
must establish at what point the illegality no longer substantially aided the police in obtaining
the evidence.
49. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
50. Id. at 392. Justice Holmes writing for the Court stated:
Of course this does not mean that facts thus [illegally] obtained become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Govern-
ment's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
Id.
5 I. See Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1138 (1967).
52. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
53. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590
(1975); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
54. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. The decision was the first to recognize the possibility of
admitting evidence into court that lacked an independent source. See generally United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273-75 (1978).
55. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
56. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
57. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
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mitting improperly obtained evidence under the "inevitable discov-
ery" exception is that execution of the unlawful conduct was not
necessary to discover the evidence. 8
The "first clear application of inevitable discovery" 59 occurred
in Somer v. United States.60 In Somer, federal agents illegally en-
tered the defendant's apartment and found a still in operation. The
agents obtained information from the defendant's wife that the de-
fendant was out delivering "the stuff," and upon the defendant's re-
turn, the agents searched his car and found illicit liquor. Although
concluding that the primary evidence had been unlawfully obtained,
Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand ruled that the seizure could be
found lawful on remand if the prosecution demonstrated that the
agents would have waited for the defendant and arrested him re-
gardless of the information the defendant's wife told the agents.6
While appearing to adopt the "inevitable discovery" rule in the
Somer decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
exception in United States v. Paroutian."I The Paroutian court held
that admission of derivative evidence under the "inevitable discov-
ery" exception would relax the protection of constitutional rights in
the very cases in which, by the State's own admission, there was no
reason for unlawful conduct.63
Within two years of Paroutian, however, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court approved the "inevitable discovery" exception in
two cases. In Wayne v. United States,64 a case involving the admis-
sion of evidence obtained from examination of a victim's body alleg-
edly discovered as the result of an unlawful entry, the Court sug-
gested that the discovery of the body was inevitable, and held the
unlawfully obtained evidence admissible." Similarly, in Killough v.
United States," the Court ruled that evidence of the condition of a
victim's body was admissible despite the fact that the defendant's
Amendment § 11.4, at 620-28 (1978); LaCount, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule. An Evolv-
ing Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 483 (1976); Note,
The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 88 (1974).
58. See United States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
942 (1972); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit - The Fourth Amendment and the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307, 308 (1964).
59. Note, supra note 57, at 90.
60. 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
61. Id. at 792.
62. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
63. Id. at 489.
64. 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
65. Id. at 209. Note that the "inevitable discovery" rule is similar to the "independent
source" rule, but differs in that the inquiry is not whether the police actually acquired the
challenged evidence by reliance upon an untainted source, but instead whether the challenged
evidence inevitably would have been discovered lawfully. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, § 11.4,
at 621 (1978).
66. 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
improperly obtained confession had led to the discovery of the
body. 7
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld
the "inevitable discovery" exception in United States v. Soehnlein,
68
in which the court permitted the introduction of confession evidence
derived from an unlawful search. The court reasoned in Soehnlein
that the unlawful conduct may have accelerated the defendant's ar-
rest, but that it did not render the evidence subsequently obtained
unusable.69
Since Soehnlein, the vast majority of all the courts which have
considered the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary
rule have adopted the exception."0 The United States Supreme
Court, however, declined to consider the constitutionality of the "in-
evitable discovery" exception despite several opportunities. 1 Finally,
in Nix v. Williams, when presented with another opportunity to re-
view the evolving "inevitable discovery" exception, the Supreme
Court seized the opportunity and ruled to recognize the "inevitable
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule."
The Williams majority introduced its analysis of the "inevitable
discovery" exception by examining the rationale advanced by the Su-
preme Court in prior decisions for extending the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by unlawful police conduct. 7 The Court recog-
nized that the primary rationale is to deter police from engaging in
unlawful conduct by depriving the prosecution of evidence obtained
in contravention of constitutional rights.
74
The Court then compared the rationale of the exclusionary rule
with the recognized justification for the "independent source" doc-
trine.7 5 The Court pointed out that the "independent source" doc-
67. Id. at 934.
68. 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970).
69. Id. at 1053. It is significant to note that the majority of cases employing the "inevi-
table discovery" exception involve circumstances in which unlawful police conduct occurred
during an investigation already in progress and resulted in evidence that would have been
ultimately obtained through routine police investigation. The unlawful conduct simply acceler-
ated the discovery of the challenged evidence. See Note, supra note 57.
70. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 57 § 11.4, at 625. For an exhaustive list of state and federal
courts which have adopted the "inevitable discovery" exception, see State v. Williams, 285
N.W.2d 248. 256-58 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1979).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (three Justices indicated
willingness to recognize the "inevitable discovery" exception, but majority of justices did not
address the issue). See also, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973); United
States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); United
States v. Schipani, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); Wayne v.
United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Note, supra
note 57.
72. 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2512 (1984).
73. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
74. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2508.
75. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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trine properly balances the interest of society in deterring police mis-
conduct and the public interest in presenting all probative evidence
to the jury.7 Consequently, the Court stated, to exclude evidence
from an independent source would place the prosecution in a worse
position than it would have been in had the unlawful conduct not
occurred. The Court held that the same undesirable result would be
attained if evidence that would have been discovered inevitably were
to be excluded, since the prosecution would be deprived of evidence
that would have been available to it but for the illegality.7 While
determining that the "independent source" doctrine did not apply to
the instant case, the Court nevertheless concluded that the rationale
of the "independent source" rule justified the Court's adoption of the
"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.7 8
Considering the quantum of proof necessary for the prosecution
to establish that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered
by lawful means, Williams argued that proof by a preponderance of
the evidence was not sufficient.1 Williams referred to United States
v. Wade,s° in which the Supreme Court required clear and convinc-
ing proof of an independent source for an in-court identification, and
contended that the same standard should be applied to the evidence
of the victim's body. The majority rejected Williams' contention not-
ing a distinct difference in the degree of certainty in the evidence
sought to be introduced in Wade and the evidence in Williams. The
majority reasoned that a significant degree of uncertainty was in-
volved in determining whether an in-court identification resulted
from independent recollection and, therefore, a heightened burden of
proof was required. The "inevitable discovery," on the other hand,
involved no speculation but focused on verifiable facts. 1 The major-
ity held, therefore, that the prosecution need only establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means.8 2 The majority concluded
76. The Court cited Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S.
52, 79 (1964) and Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457, 458-59 (1972) in support of
this position.
77. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2508. Contra United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th
Cir. 1974), modified, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974). In Castellana, the court concluded, "To
admit unlawfully obtained evidence on the strength of some judge's speculation that it would
have been discovered legally anyway would be to cripple the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to
improper police conduct."
78. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
79. Id. n.5.
80. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
81. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.5. This is the major point of distinction between the
majority's opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. In contrast to the majority,
Justice Brennan found an element of uncertainty in the information sought to be introduced
under the "inevitable discovery" exception. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
82. Id. The Court cited two cases in which it had previously established relevant guide-
lines. First, in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974), the Court held that
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that once the prosecution meets this standard, the deterrence ration-
ale of the exclusionary rule has so little relevance that the evidence
should be admitted.83
The Court next turned to the requirement established by the
court of appeals 84 that the prosecution prove an absence of bad faith
on the part of the police under the "inevitable discovery" exception.
The Court quickly rejected the requirement, observing that the po-
lice would be placed in a worse position than they would have been
in had no illegality occurred. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
pointed out that enforcement of the good-faith requirement would
result in relevant and reliable information being withheld from juries
that would have been available absent police misconduct, and a cor-
responding, significant cost to society of excluding the truth.85 In ad-
dition, the Court argued that significant disincentives which exist to
discourage the police from obtaining evidence unlawfully also lessen
the probability that the "inevitable discovery" exception would foster
police misconduct.86
The majority also rejected Williams' contention that the Court
could not balance competing values in determining whether the ille-
gally obtained evidence was properly admitted since Williams did
not waive his sixth amendment right to counsel,87 and the sixth
amendment exclusionary rule guarantees the right to a fair trial. The
Court acknowledged, "The sixth amendment right to counsel pro-
tects against unfairness by preserving the adversary process in which
the reliability of proffered evidence may be tested in cross-examina-
tion,"88 but found that the reliability of the challenged evidence in
Williams was not affected by the detective's misconduct. The Court
reasoned that the presence of counsel in the police car when Wil-
proof by a preponderance of the evidence was required at suppression hearings. Second, in
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972), the Court concluded that a preponderance of the
evidence standard was appropriate to prove the voluntariness of a defendant's confession.
83. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2509. But see Comment, supra note 51, at 1143 (inevitable
discovery found at odds with exclusionary rule since police gain advantage); Note, Applying
the "'Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine to Evidence Obtained Through Statements Made
Without Proper Miranda Warnings, 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 271, 274 (1984) (exclusion-
ary rule loses deterrent effect when police permitted this no-risk action); Stomper v. State, 662
P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1983).
84. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983). To admit evidence under the
"inevitable discovery" rule, the court required that the State prove that the police did not act
in bad faith and that the evidence would have been discovered inevitably. Id. at 1166. See
infra note 32.
85. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
86. Id. The Court cited the possibility of departmental sanctions and civil liability as
examples. See also, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971).
87. The Court previously determined that the record did not demonstrate a waiver by
Williams of his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977). See supra note 28.
88. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
iiams made his incriminating statements would not have altered the
evidence.8 9 The majority also concluded that suppression of the chal-
lenged evidence would not have enhanced the fairness of the trial
proceedings. The Court found that in situations in which the prose-
cution satisfies the proof requirements of the "inevitable discovery"
exception, the prosecution and defendant are placed in the same po-
sitions they would have been in had the illegality not occurred. Sup-
pression of the evidence in those situations, therefore, would not
serve to enhance the fairness of the trial, but would actually under-
mine the adversary system since the State would be placed in a
worse position then it would have been in had there been no police
misconduct. 90
Having evaluated and approved of the "inevitable discovery"
exception, it remained for the Court to determine whether evidence
of the discovery of the victim's body in Williams should have been
introduced into trial under the "inevitable discovery" exception. Wil-
liams contended that the record contained only the "post hoc ration-
alization" that the search efforts would have proceeded had he not
led the police to the victim's body. The Court examined the testi-
mony of the director of the search teams,9 who testified that the
victim's body would have been discovered within an additional three
to five hours had the search continued. The Court found that the
search teams would have resumed their search had Williams not
guided the police to the body, and the body would have been discov-
ered inevitably.92 Thus, the majority concluded that the "inevitable
discovery" exception was appropriately applied to the challenged evi-
dence of the case.
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring only in judgment in
which he argued that the majority failed to adequately discuss three
major aspects of the case. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority
should have stated that the Court's decision had an "integrity" of its
own and was not merely a response to pressures created by the tragic
facts of the case.93 In addition, Justice Stevens contended that if the
majority had clearly identified and explained the violation of Wil-
liams' sixth amendment right to counsel, the Court's answers to per-
89. Id.
90. Id. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. But see supra note 83"(authori-
ties cited opposing the majority).
91. The director's testimony was offered at the suppression hearing preceding Williams'
second trial. Tr. of Hearings on Motion to Suppress, State v. Williams, No. CR 55805, at 34-
39 (May 31, 1977).
92. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2511. The Court noted that three other courts reviewed the
evidence independently and also found that the child's body would have been discovered by the
search teams. See Kamisar, supra note 14. See also supra note 18.
93. Justice Stevens admitted that the tragic facts could have influenced the Court's
decision, but quickly pointed out that the nature of the crime "does not permit any court to
condone a violation of constitutional rights." Id.
tinent questions presented in the case and the Court's decision to
permit the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence into Wil-
liams' second trial would have been more readily understandable.
94
While recognizing that the majority did discuss the "societal cost" of
excluding probative evidence, Justice Stevens concluded that "the
more relevant cost is that imposed on society by police officers who
decide to take procedural shortcuts instead of complying with the
law,' 95 which, in Williams, Justice Stevens claimed was years of
costly, unnecessary litigation.
Justice Stevens did agree with the majority, however, that the
"inevitable discovery" exception does not provide the police with an
incentive to commit violations of the Constitution since the prosecu-
tion has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the information inevitably would have been found.96
Justice White joined the majority opinion and wrote a separate
opinion solely to intimate that Justice Stevens' remarks about the
"societal cost" of the detective's conduct were irrelevant since four
members of the sharply divided Supreme Court in Brewer v. Wil-
liams9 7 believed that the detective had not even violated proper po-
lice conduct, let alone the Constitution.98
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissenting
opinion. Justice Brennan attacked the majority's decision to allow
the prosecution to introduce evidence under the "inevitable discov-
ery" exception by satisfying a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard that the information would have been discovered inevitably.
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority to the extent of recogniz-
ing the "inevitable discovery" exception as a constitutional exception
to the exclusionary rule, but argued that the majority should have
required a heightened burden of proof that the information inevita-
bly would have been obtained by lawful means before introducing
94. Justice Stevens cited several Supreme Court cases holding that an individual's
rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment may not be undermined by police procedure. See,
e.g., Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (incriminating statements deliberately
elicited from uncounseled defendant by federal agents held to violate sixth amendment); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (confession obtained by police after prolonged interroga-
tion of uncounseled defendant held to violate sixth amendment). See generally Yasimar, supra
note 28.
95. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2516.
96. Id. Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that proof by a preponderance of the
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the evidence would have been discovered inevitably
since the evidence could be objectively verified or impeached. Id. at 2516 n.8.
97. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist stated that the detective did not deliberately isolate Williams from his lawyers, nor
did the detective deliver the "Christian burial speech" solely to obtain incriminating evidence.
The Justices also held that the detective's speech was not tantamount to interrogation. Id. at
437-41.
98. Justice White stated, "That five Justices later thought he [the detective] was mis-
taken does not call for making him out to be a villain or for a lecture on deliberate police
misconduct and its resulting costs to society." Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2513.
the challenged evidence into court. Justice Brennan asserted that the
majority failed to recognize a critical difference between the "inevi-
table discovery" exception and the "independent source" rule to
which it is "akin." 9 The distinction, according to Justice Brennan, is
that evidence sought to be admitted under the "inevitable discovery"
exception has not been obtained from an independent source, but
rather would have been obtained by lawful means had the indepen-
dent investigations continued. Justice Brennan observed that the "in-
evitable discovery" exception, therefore, involves a "hypothetical
finding that differs in kind from the factual finding that precedes
application of the independent source rule." 00 Because of this ele-
ment of uncertainty, Justice Brennan proposed -that the prosecution
be required to demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that the
information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means
before permitting evidence to be admitted into court under the "in-
evitable discovery" exception. 101
The United States Supreme Court has again narrowed the
scope of the exclusionary rule by recognizing a third major exception
to the rule. By adopting the "inevitable discovery" rule for the first
time in Williams, the Court has given the prosecution in a criminal
case the opportunity to untaint valuable evidence obtained by official
misconduct and present the evidence to the jury without exploiting a
recognized violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. In adopt-
ing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule, the
United States Supreme Court has taken one more step in its quest to
have all relevant and reliable evidence presented to the jury and still
preserve a defendant's constitutionally protected rights.
99. Justice Brennan and the majority indicated that the "inevitable discovery" excep-
tion was closely related to the "independent source" doctrine. Id. at 2517. Most courts ruling
on the "inevitable discovery" exception have viewed the exception as a logical extension of the
"independent source" doctrine. See Johnson, The Return of the "Christian Burial Speech"
Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349, 363 (1984).
100. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2517.
101. Id.
[Casenote by Laura Davis Jones].
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCE CLAUSE - IMPLIED
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF STATE ACTIONS THAT BURDEN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE NOT SUFFICIENT To AVOID COM-
MERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY. South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,1 the
United States Supreme Court held 2 that the mere existence of a fed-
eral timber conservation statutes did not constitute congressional ap-
proval of a parallel Alaskan state statute4 that would place the state
statute beyond commerce clause 5 scrutiny. In so holding the court
answered in the negative the prior unresolved question of whether
implied congressional approval of a state statute was sufficient to an-
swer a commerce clause challenge. A separate part of the Court's
opinion, concurred in by only three justices,' also rejected Alaska's
argument that its actions were immune from commerce clause scru-
tiny because it was a "market participant."
'7
The State of Alaska, by statute, granted the Commissioner of
the Department of Natural Resources the power to attach limita-
tions and conditions to the sale of state-owned timber. 8 In Septem-
ber, 1980, Commissioner Robert LeResche 9 announced the intended
sale of 49,185,000 board-feet of timber from remote Icy Cape. In
accordance with the policy of the Department of Natural Resources,
the proposed contract of sale mandated that the purchaser perform
the primary processing"0 of the timber in Alaska. 1 The admitted
I. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
2. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan concurred in the
result. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in part and dissented in part.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. Justice Marshall took no part in the
decision.
3. For the text of the provision see infra note 15.
4. For the text of the provision see infra note 8.
5. See infra note 22.
6. Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens, delivered the
plurality opinion.
7. For a discussion of the market participant doctrine see infra notes 40-53.
8. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.115 (1976) provided in pertinent part that "[t]he commis-
sioner, upon recommendation of the director, shall determine the timber and other materials to
be sold, and the limitations, conditions, and terms of sale."
9. Robert LeResche, the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources, was
replaced by Esther Wunnicke after the decision by the court of appeals.
10. Primary processing means "manufacture which is first in order of time or develop-
ment." ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 76.130(b) (1974) (repealed 1982). Alaska required
logs to be slabbed so that at least one side of each log was flat. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11,
purpose of this condition was economic protectionism. 2
South-Central Timber Development Inc.,' a an interested bidder
who did not operate a mill for processing in Alaska, claimed that it
was economically less efficient for the primary processing to take
place in Alaska" and that the added cost would make it impossible
for them to compete. Its protests went unheeded and South-Central
brought suit in the Federal District Court of Alaska to enjoin any
sale made under the contested condition. South-Central argued that
the contract provision was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce and was therefore invalid. Alaska countered by pointing
to a federal statute8 that was similar to its own, arguing that such
federal action demonstrated the necessary congressional approval to
withstand a commerce clause challenge.
The district court found for South-Central. The court reasoned
§§ 71.230, 71.910 (1982).
I1. Ninety percent of the Alaska timber is actually exported to Japan. South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2239 n.4 (1984).
12. On June 30, 1961, Governor William A. Egan announced the policy behind the
primary manufacture requirement. He stated that "[iut is the policy of the State of Alaska to
protect existing industries, provide for the establishment of new industries, derive revenue from
all timber resources, and manage the State's forests on a sustained yield basis." Joint Appen-
dix at 28a, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
13. South-Central was a wholly owned subsidiary of lwakura-Gumi, Ltd., a Japanese
corporation, until February 17, 1983. On that date, South-Central was purchased by the Far
North Supply Corporation, a Washington corporation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii,
South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
14. A South-Central affidavit, which explained why primary processing in Alaska was
economically less efficient, was noted by the Court. Reasons included the following: Round
logs are preferable for small operations; round logs are preferable because they can be stored
and transported in the water; round logs are much less subject to deterioration than are the
logs that have been through the processing procedure; and South-Central had had difficulty
selling processed logs in the past. 104 S. Ct. at 2239-40 n.7.
15. 30 Stat. 35 (1897), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1976) provides in pertinent part
as follows:
For the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber and promoting the
younger growth on national forests, the Secretary of Agriculture, under such
rules and regulations as he shall prescribe, may cause to be designated and ap-
praised so much of the dead, matured, or large growth of trees found upon such
national forests as may be compatible with the utilization of the forest thereon,
and may sell the same for not less than the appraised value in such quantities to
each purchaser as he shall prescribe, to be used in the State or Territory in
which such timber reservation may be situated, respectively, but not for export
therefrom . . . . Payment for such timber is to be made to the receiver of the
local land office of the district wherein said timber may be sold, under such rules
and regulations as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe.
A related federal regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 223.10(i) (1977), as amended, 36 C.F.R. § 223.10(c)
(1982) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Unprocessed timber from National Forest System lands in Alaska may not be
exported from the United States or shipped to other States without prior ap-
proval of the Regional Forester. This requirement is necessary to ensure the de-
velopment and continued existence of adequate wood processing capacity in that
State for the sustained utilization of timber from the National Forests which are
geographically isolated from other processing facilities.
The regulation was adopted to encourage the Alaskan timber processing industry in light
of the fact that Alaskan forests were so far removed from existing processing plants.
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that since Congress had not expressly given approval to Alaska's
timber laws, the laws were subject to commerce clause scrutiny.16
The district court also rejected Alaska's market-participant doc-
trine17 claim of immunity and declared the primary manufacture re-
quirement to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. 1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that im-
plicit congressional authorization of the Alaska policy was suffi-
cient. 19 In so doing, the court did not address the issues of market-
participant immunity and the unconstitutional burden on commerce.
Circuit Judge Kennedy reasoned that because the federal policy to
support local industry was so clear, the parallel state policy was
valid.20 The court also recognized the importance of this specific sale
to local industry, noting that the sale of timber from nearby national
forests had been halted. Alaska, in the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, was merely filling a gap in a federal program, an activity
deemed to be perfectly acceptable." In reversing this conclusion, the
Supreme Court ruled that what was valid and acceptable to the
Ninth Circuit was unconstitutional.
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution affirma-
tively grants to Congress the power to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations and among the several states.2 A necessary corollary to
this affirmative grant of power is the limitation of a state's ability to
burden foreign and interstate commerce even if Congress itself has
16. Both parties had moved for summary judgment, and defendant-intervenor, Kenai
Lumber Company, Inc., had moved to dismiss the action brought by South-Central. The dis-
trict court granted South-Central's motion for summary judgment, denied the motions of the
defendants, and issued an injunction to stop the proposed sale of timber. South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139, 144 (D. Alaska 1981).
17. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
18. The district court reasoned that Congress, although it had adopted a federal policy
on primary manufacture of federal timber, "ha[d] in no way expressly exempted state timber
laws from commerce clause restrictions. Given Congress' silence, a negative is presumed to bar
state action inimical to the national commerce. ... Id. at 142. For a discussion of the
commerce clause scrutiny test applied to determine the constitutionality of a state action that
affects commerce, see infra 68.
19. South-Central Trade Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1982).
20. Circuit Judge Kennedy's reasoning for finding implicit authorization was as follows:
The rule acknowledging congressional power to approve otherwise impermissible
state regulation of interstate commerce is applied in cases where Congress has
expressly authorized such regulation . . . .But such express authorization is not
always necessary. There will be instances, like the case before us, where federal
policy is so clearly delineated that a state may enact a parallel policy without
explicit congressional approval, even if the purpose and effect of the state law is
to favor local interests.
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890, 892-93 (1982).
21. The court of appeals concluded that Alaska's policy "could not have been more in
keeping with federal timber policy." Id. at 893.
22. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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not legislated in the area."s Given the sheer magnitude of interstate
commerce in this country, states often find themselves enacting legis-
lation that in some way impacts on interstate commerce. The key
question has become to what extent may a state affect commerce
between the states without violating the commerce clause. Early on,
the Supreme Court determined that not all interference was prohib-
ited. In Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.24 the Court upheld
a Delaware act that granted a local company the power to build a
dam across a navigable creek. Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, observed that Delaware acted out of legitimate economic and
health concerns and legislation seeking to meet these concerns was
within a state's power so long as it did not collide with the power of
the general government.25 Similarly, in Cooley v. Board of War-
dens,26 the Court validated a municipal ordinance that regulated pi-
lots in the port of Philadelphia. In Cooley, however, the Court
stressed that Congress had passed legislation that expressly stated its
intention to leave such matters to the state.2 7 Both Willson and Coo-
ley were narrowly decided and based on the specific factual circum-
stances. Both were examples, however, of a state's ability to burden
interstate commerce, either through legislation on relatively local
matters in areas where Congress had not acted, or through legisla-
tion on matters where Congress had stated an intention to let the
states legislate.
One example of a state action declared constitutional despite a
heavy burden on interstate commerce is South Carolina State High-
way Department v. Barnwell Brothers.2 8 In Barnwell, a unanimous
Court upheld a South Carolina law that prohibited the use of over-
sized trucks on its state highways. Although ruling that local safety
and economic concerns were more weighty than the negative impact
on interstate commerce, Justice Stone warned that state policies that
were merely protectionist would be closely scrutinized.29
23. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). (New York law granting
a monopoly over steamboat navigation found to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. An act inconsistent with the United States Constitution is a nullity.)
24. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
25. Id. at 251.
26. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
27. Congress, in I Stat. 54 (1789), had specifically decreed that regulation of boat
pilots in harbors and ports would be left to state law. Justice Curtis reasoned that because this
was a valid act of Congress granting some of its own power to the states, Pennsylvania's law
requiring ships using the port of Philadelphia to engage Philadelphia pilots was a constitu-
tional exercise of a delegated power.
28. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
29. Justice Stone noted the following:
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to
gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or
to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those
within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even
Particular examples of what Justice Stone forewarned were
quick to follow. State actions declared unconstitutional since Barn-
well include the following: an Arizona scheme limiting the length of
trains passing through the state; 0 the denial of a license to construct
and operate a new milk processing plant because of a desire to re-
strict competition; a' a mandate that all cantaloupes grown in Ari-
zona be packed in the state by specified methods;32 a New Jersey
action outlawing the transport of waste into the state without the
approval of the Commissioner of Environmental Protection; 3 an
Oklahoma plan to prohibit the shipment of naturally grown minnows
outside the state;' a Nebraska scheme restricting the export of
ground water;' and a New Hampshire restriction on the export of
hydroelectric power produced at a federal facility.3 6 There are re-
peated warnings throughout this line of cases that commerce may
not be burdened by the protectionist, self-serving desires of a single
state.37 Rather, states must view the nation as one economic unit, so
as to encourage competition between states.38 The court has been
even more adamant in insisting upon a free flow of trade in case in
which states have thrown up barriers attempting to protect their nat-
ural resources.39
though Congress has not acted.
Id. at 185 n.2. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-9 (1978). Professor
Tribe emphasizes that a state may not discriminate solely upon the out-of-state status of an-
other party.
30. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
31. H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
32. Pike v. Bruce Church,Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
33. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. 617 (1978).
34. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
35. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See also infra note 55.
36. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). See also infra
note 56.
37. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The Court warned that
when "economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalid-
ity will be erected . . . . The clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks
the flow of interstate commerce at a state's borders." Id. at 624. See also Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), which stated that a reason for the commerce clause was "to
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization." Id. at 325. See generally L. TRIBE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-2, 6-3 (Supp. 1979) (Overview discussion of the anti-
discrimination doctrine and a discussion of Philadelphia v. New Jersey and protectionism).
38. See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). Justice Jackson
stated that "This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of
powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs
barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that states are not separable economic
units." Id. at 537-38. See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Justice
Stone conceded local control over concerns that may affect commerce, "provided that it does
not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines, or interfere with it in
matters with respect to which uniformity of regulation is of predominant national concern." Id.
at 770.
39. See, e.g., H. P. Hood and Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). Justice Jackson
warned against discriminatory practices involving raw materials as follows:
The established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of
protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions.
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The much criticized40 market participant doctrine is one excep-
tional situation in which the Supreme Court has ruled state action
permissible, even though the action had an otherwise impermissible
impact on commerce. The doctrine was first announced in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp."' in which Justice Powell wrote for a di-
vided Court.42 In Hughes, the state statute in question was a Mary-
land provision that awarded a bounty for each old car hulk that was
retrieved by a wrecker or processor and destroyed. The amended
statute,'43 through a stricter licensing requirement, made it practi-
cally impossible for out-of-state wreckers to bring hulks into the
state and collect the bounty. The court upheld the scheme despite
the burden it placed on interstate commerce, ruling that if a state
participates in the market, it has a right to favor its own citizens
over others." Maryland, playing the role of a purchaser, had the
right to chose to purchase only from Maryland wreckers.
We need only consider the consequences if each of the few states that produce
copper, lead, high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas should decree that
industries located in that state shall have priority.
Id. at 538-39. See also New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982),
holding that "[o]ur cases consistently have held that the Commerce Clause ... precludes a
State from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived there-
from." Id. at 338. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-8 (1978) for a
discussion of a state's right to regulate the distribution of natural resources. Generally, the
conclusion is that "a state may not allocate the available supply in a way that favors local
users at the expense of out-of-state consumers." Id. at 333.
40. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - State Purchasing Ac-
tivity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review - Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18
B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REV. 893 (1977), which outlines the Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp. decision and concludes by saying that it is "an unwarranted departure from the oft-
stated concept that the goal 'of the commerce clause is to weld the United States into an
integrated economic unit where state boundaries present no impediment to commerce." Id. at
928. See also Anson and Schenkkan, Federalism, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-
Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REV. 71 (1980). After meticulously overviewing the market-
participant doctrine, the authors conclude that "[t/he Court should respect its own federalist
principles by leaving regulation of state disposition of truly state-owned natural resources and
state commercial enterprises to Congress." Id. at 99. The authors object to the Court creating
a new commerce clause exception by judicial legislation. See also The Supreme Court, 1982
Term - Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70 (1983). The blanket
application of the market-participant doctrine in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construc-
tion Workers, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983) is criticized. Instead, the application of a burden/
benefit analysis is proposed. See generally Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
818 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (A general rejection of the development of the market-
participant doctrine. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall and Justice White).
41. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
6-10 (1978) (Professor Tribe discussed the Alexandria Scrap Corp. decision within a discus-
sion of heightened Court tolerance for selective state subsidies).
42. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justice Stewart, delivered the majority opinion. Justice Stevens concurred in the
result. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice White, dissented.
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 11 § 1002.2(f)(s) (1970).
44. Justice Powell concluded that "[niothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the mar-
ket and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
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The market-participant doctrine was extended to include states
acting as sellers in Reeves v. Stake."" Reeves, a Wyoming cement
purchaser who bought ninety percent of his cement from a South
Dakota plant owned by the state, faced being forced out of business
when South Dakota adopted a policy of meeting the requirements of
in-state customers and making only the remaining product available
to out of staters. A sharply divided Court held that when a state acts
as a proprietor, rather than as a regulator,' the market-participant
doctrine shields state action from Court scrutiny. The Court drew a
distinction between cement, a finished product, and the raw materi-
als out of which cement is made, indicating that such a scheme in-
volving natural resources might be more difficult to justify.47 The
case also produced a sharp dissent which argued that the South Da-
kota statute was a blatant example of protectionism that violated all
notions of freedom of trade and rejected the notion of the nation as
one economic unit.'8 The dissent further argued that a state should
be allowed to claim market-participant immunity from the com-
merce clause only when undertaking integral governmental
functions. 9
The most recent Supreme Court case recognizing market-par-
ticipant immunity is White v. Massachusetts Council of Construc-
tion Workers, Inc."0 In that case, the court upheld an order by
Mayor White of Boston stating that for construction projects funded
wholly or partially by the city, work forces of at least fifty percent
45. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
46. The Court has drawn a distinction between a state acting as a proprietor and a
state as a regulator. States performing proprietary functions can expect market-participant
immunity when participating in the market place. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (5th ed.
1979) defines a proprietor as "[olne who has the legal right or exclusive title to anything. In
many instances it is synonymous with owner." See also Note, Constitutional Law - Com-
merce Clause - State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review -
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. INDUS AND COM. L. REv. 893 (1977). Proprietary
activities are described as a government acting for its own advantage, not seeking to promote a
governmental goal, or a government acting for its own end use. Id. at 907-09.
47. Justice Blackmun argued the following:
Cement is not a natural resource like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals ....
It is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and
human labor act on raw materials. South Dakota has not sought to limit access
to the State's limestone or other minerals used to make cement.
Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1980).
48. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 447 n.l (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. The dissent's attempt to limit the market-participant doctrine to integral govern-
mental functions was an attempt to combine major themes from Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), decided
by the Court on the same day. The dissent asserted that "application of Commerce Clause
[scrutiny] should turn on the nature of the governmental activity involved. If a public enter-
prise undertakes an 'integral operatio[n] in the areas of traditional governmental functions,'
.... the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant." Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983).
city residents must be hired. The Court ruled that the executive or-
der "sound[ed] a harmonious note" ' 1 with the policy behind federal
Urban Development Action Grants,52 and was therefore immune
from scrutiny because the local governmental action had been ap-
proved by Congress 8 and because the city was a market-participant.
In South-Central Timber, Alaska maintained that sufficient
congressional approval was manifested in the existence of a parallel
federal timber conservation statute. The Court, however, was unwill-
ing to broaden the exception to commerce clause scrutiny by al-
lowing states to legislate when implicit, not explicit, authorization by
Congress is claimed. In rejecting the implicit-authorization theory
set forth by Alaska, Justice White emphasized the fundamental dif-
ference between the federal and state provisions and the policies be-
hind each. The federal statute was an exercise of Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce aimed exclusively at the use of federal
lands. The Alaska plan, on the other hand, dealt only with state
lands and was designed to protect and enhance Alaskan industry,
necessarily at the expense of out-of-state industry. The court thought
it significant that Congress had failed to make reference to any state
scheme and therefore concluded that it would not assume congres-
sional approval."
The Court looked to three recent decisions to support its conclu-
sion that express authorization was necessary to justify an otherwise
unconstitutionally burdensome state action: Sporhase v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas;55 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire;6
51. Id. at 1047.
52. The federal policy "require[d] that a city certify that its project would not be un-
dertaken by the private sector without public funds and that the project will alleviate economic
distress by helping the poor, minorities, and unemployed." Id. at 1047 n.1 1.
53. The conclusion set forth by Justice Rehnquist cited market-participant immunity
and express authorization by Congress of the executive order, as follows:
We hold that on the record before us the application of the mayor's executive
order to the contracts in question did not violate the Commerce Clause ....
Insofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction
contracts for public projects, it was a market participant .... Insofar as the
mayor's executive order was applied to projects funded in part with funds ob-
tained from the federal programs ... , the order was affirmatively sanctioned by
the pertinent regulations of those programs.
Id. at 1048.
54. In a footnote, Justice White pointed out that Congress, in a hearing before the
Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy, had been asked to consider expressly
authorizing the primary processing requirement by states for state-owned forests, but had de-
clined to do so. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 n.8
(1984).
55. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978), requiring that anyone
taking Nebraska groundwater out of the ground for transport to another state acquire a De-
partment of Water Resources permit to do so, was declared unconstitutional in violation of the
commerce clause.
56. 455 U.S. 331 (1982). Since 1913, New Hampshire prohibited the transmitting of
hydroelectric power outside the state without the permission of the Public Utilities Commis-
sion. In 1980, the state exercised the power to restrict the export of the power. The Supreme
and White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Workers,
Inc. 7 The Court argued that each of these decisions recognized a
need for express authorization by Congress. The Court's reliance on
White was particularly significant, for the State of Alaska had cited
language in White to suggest that a state action that sounded a har-
monious note with a federal policy could be declared constitutional
despite burdens on commerce. Justice White pointed out, however,
that the harmonious state action in White ultimately needed market-
participant immunity for approval.
In further support of its rejection of Alaska's theory of implicit
approval, the Court noted that congressional approval of state bur-
dens on commerce must be explicit in order to assure that the collec-
tive will of the nation approves of such action. Otherwise, "unrepre-
sented interests will be adversely affected by restraints on
commerce."58 An additional fact calling for heightened caution was
that Alaska's statute had an impact on foreign commerce, a field in
which a uniform national policy is even more necessary.59 Turning to
Alaska's second contention, that its statute was justified on a market
participant theory, a plurality of the court found this argument to be
unsound as well.
Justice White, who presented the plurality opinion,60 argued
that to fit under a market-participant theory a state cannot reach
beyond the transaction in which it has privity of contract to impose
"down-stream restrictions." Alaska was directly involved only in the
sale and not in the processing procedure and therefore could only
regulate the sale. In a normal commercial transaction, a seller
should have no say in what happens to the goods after the sale. Since
the basis of the market-participant theory is the comparison of the
state to an ordinary seller or buyer, the state should likewise not be
able to reach activities beyond the immediate sale.
Alaska's assertion that Reeves stood for the proposition that a
state seller could impose any condition of sale that it wished was
Court ruled that this was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
57. 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983).
58. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (1984).
59. Justice White noted that "[t]he need for affirmative approval is heightened by the
fact that Alaska's policy has substantial ramifications beyond the Nation's borders. The need
for a consistent and coherent foreign policy, which is the exclusive responsibility of the Federal
Government, enhances the necessity that congressional authorization not be lightly implied."
Id. at 2243 n.7. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 6-20 (1978)
(State regulation of foreign commerce). See also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976), where Justice Brennan's majority opinion stated that "the Federal Government must
speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Id. at
285.
60. A plurality is "lain opinion of an appellate court in which more justices join in any
concurring opinion (though not a majority of the court) ...as distinguished from a majority
opinion in which a larger number of the justices on the panel join than not." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1039 (5th ed. 1979).
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flatly rejected by the plurality. Justice White distinguished Reeves
on three grounds: Reeves did not involve foreign commerce, a natu-
ral resource, nor did the state attempt to place restrictions on re-
sale.- 1 Justice White noted that the market-participant doctrine only
applied to the narrow market in which a state is involved, for unless
the market "is relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the po-
tential of swallowing up the rule that [sitates may not impose sub-
stantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with the
permissible state purpose of fostering local industry." 62
The plurality developed two analogies to the effect of Alaska's
statutes. First, Justice White compared the downstream restriction
to a restraint on alienation," an act considered at common law to be
repugnant to public policy. Second, Justice White likened the at-
tempted state action to a vertical restraint of trade, a result that
spawned modern antitrust legislation. 64 In sum, the plurality con-
cluded that a state "may not avail itself of the market-participant
doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber-
processing market in which it is not a participant."6 5
The final section of the plurality opinion rejected Alaska's argu-
ment that the primary processing condition imposed in the contract
of sale did not substantially burden interstate or foreign commerce.
The application of the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.6 test67 to this pro-
61. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2245 (1984).
62. Id. at 2246.
63. The plurality cited to Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373
(1911) for a clear statement on the common law attitude towards restraints or alienation,
finding that "the right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnox-
ious to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass
from hand to hand." Id. at 404.
64. The plurality reasoned as follows:
[T]he antitrust laws place limits on vertical restraints. It is no defense in an
action charging vertical trade restraints that the same end could be achieved
through vertical integration; if it were, there would be virtually no antitrust se-
curity of vertical arrangements. We reject the contention that a State's action as
a market regulator may be upheld against Commerce Clause challenge on the
ground that the State could achieve the same end as a market participant. We
therefore find it unimportant for present purposes that the State could support
its processing industry by selling only to Alaska processors, by vertical integra-
tion, or by direct subsidy.
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (1984).
65. Id. at 2246-47.
66. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
67. The test developed to help to determine if a state action unconstitutionally burdens
interstate commerce is as follows:
Where a statute regulates even handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the putative local benefits . . . . If a legitimate local interest is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
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tectionist state policy led the plurality to a judgment of per se inva-
lidity of the Alaska scheme. Important to the conclusion was the fact
that Alaska could have achieved its protectionist goals in a manner
that was less burdensome to interstate commerce. 68
Justice Brennan's short concurring opinion accepted Justice
White's opinion in full, but reasserted Brennan's ongoing uneasiness
with the market-participant doctrine.69 Justice Powell and Chief Jus-
tice Burger concurred in the finding of no implicit authorization of
the state action, but did not join with the plurality opinion. They felt
that the issues discussed therein, not addressed by the court of ap-
peals below, could best be resolved on remand.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. Curi-
ously enough, the dissent implicitly authorized the court of appeals'
finding of implicit authorization by avoiding discussion of that issue
and moving directly into an attack on the plurality's treatment of the
market-participant doctrine. Justice Rehnquist first attacked the plu-
rality's use of an antitrust ° analogy. He found it improper to use
this analogy because a state, immune from antitrust regulation when
acting as a regulator,' 1 is subject to antitrust regulation only when
acting as a market-participant .7 The dissent's criticism of the plu-
rality was that the plurality used a doctrine to prove that Alaska was
not a market-participant that only attaches when a state is a market-
participant. Finally, Justice Rehnquist pointed to three alternative
means73 by which Alaska could have obtained its desired goals. In-
activities.
Id. at 142. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5 (1978) (State acts
affecting interstate commerce will be upheld if rationally related to a legitimate state end and
if the state interest outweighs the regulatory burden and discrimination resulting from the
state action).
68. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-12 (1978) for a discussion of
the availability of less restrictive alternative means. If such means are available, then a state
program that burdens commerce will, in all likelihood, be rejected. See also Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). The city of Madison, Wisconsin could not mandate
that all milk sold in the city had to be pasturized at plants within five miles of the city "even in
the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasona-
ble nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are availa-
ble." Id. at 354.
69. See supra note 40.
70. See supra note 64.
71. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In looking at the Sherman Antitrust
Act and its applicability to states, the Court held that "It]he Sherman Act makes no mention
of states as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action
directed by a state." Id. at 351.
72. See Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S. Ct.
1011 (1983). In responding to a challenge that the State of Alabama was engaging in activi-
ties violative of antitrust laws by allowing the pharmacy at the state hospital to undersell local
pharmacies, the Court concluded that "the [state] exemption [to antitrust laws] does not apply
where a State has chosen to compete in the private retail market." Id. at 1014.
73. Justice Rehnquist suggested constitutional means to reach the desired end, includ-
ing the following: The state could sell only to firms that had primary-processing plants in
Alaska; the state could subsidize the primary processing industry; and the state could pay to
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stead of viewing these as less restrictive alternative means,74 Rehn-
quist criticized the plurality for striking down one method of ob-
taining a goal that he felt any one of the other means would have
legitimately obtained.
Although the decision in South-Central Timber will only imme-
diately influence the sale of timber in a remote Alaskan forest, the
influence on commerce clause doctrine is far from remote. The Su-
preme Court has pronounced that a state may not justify by implica-
tion a policy that burdens interstate or foreign commerce. Congress
must expressly authorize such a state action, even if that action is
entirely in harmony with an existing federal policy. The decision has
focused a formerly hazy line of delineation between state and federal
governments with regard to the commerce clause. Further, the plu-
rality opinion's limitation of the market-participant doctrine to the
precise market in which the state is participating indicates a desire
to more clearly define this much criticized doctrine. Although the
Court in no way appears to be willing to rescind the doctrine, the
time apparently has come to limit it. Both the decision to require
express congressional authorization of state actions burdening com-
merce, even if those actions are in harmony with a federal policy,
and the language of the plurality indicating a desire to limit the
market-participant doctrine indicate a tightening of the reins on a
state's ability to affect interstate commerce.
have the logs processed and sell only processed logs.
74. See supra note 68.
[Casenote by Nathaniel Hunter]
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